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I. INTRODUCTION 
Arthur von Mehren's last and most ambitious project, a Hague Convention 
unifying rules on international jurisdiction and foreign judgments, did not 
come to fruition. One reason were prevailing differences over substantive 
issues, that have been discussed at length.1 Yet such differences might have 
been overcome through compromise, had there not been a problem that has 
received less attention but may have been more fundamental precisely 
because it was not fully recognized: Most delegates implicitly presumed that 
judgments conventions must take on a certain shape. One such presumption 
that has been discussed was that all jurisdictional bases in a Convention must 
be either required (so courts in all member states must exercise jurisdiction 
under certain circumstances), or excluded (so courts are not allowed to 
exercise jurisdiction under certain circumstances). A second assumption, less 
well recognized, was that Conventions that regulate jurisdiction in addition to 
recognition and enforcement of judgments must be symmetrical: If a 
judgment rests on a required basis of jurisdiction, other states must be 
obliged to enforce it (unless there are other reasons not to enforce it, such as 
fraud); if it rests on an excluded basis, other states must be restrained from 
enforcing it.  
Both assumptions are wrong, and Arthur von Mehren has worked tirelessly to 
show this. The alternative he developed was the mixed convention, an 
ingenious model to bridge the gap between simple enforcement conventions 
that regulate only the recognition of foreign judgments and double conven-
tions that regulate jurisdiction both at the decision and at the recognition 
stage.2 This concept formed the basis of the US proposal at the Hague.3 Yet 
1 Elsewhere I argue that some of these differences arise because Americans and Europeans argue 
about jurisdiction from different paradigms: Ralf Michaels, Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction, 26 MICH. 
J. INT’L L. ___ (2006). 
2 Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition of United States Judgments Abroad and Foreign Judg-
ments in the United States: Would an International Convention Be Useful?, 57 RabelsZ 449, 456-9 
(1993); Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A New 
Approach for the Hague Conference?, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 271, 282-7 (1994) (hereinafter von 
Mehren, New Approach); Arthur T. von Mehren, The Case for a Convention-mixte Approach to 
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate and Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 61 RABELS 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALS PRIVATRECHT (RABELSZ) 86 (1997) (hereinafter 
von Mehren, Case); Arthur T. von Mehren, Enforcing Judgments Abroad: Reflections on the Design 
of Recognition Conventions, 24 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 17 (1998) (hereinafter von Mehren, Design); Arthur 
T. von Mehren, Drafting a Convention on International Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign 
Judgments Acceptable Worldwide: Can the Hague Conference Project Succeed?, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 
191, 196-202 (2001) (hereinafter von Mehren, Drafting). 
3 See Some Reflections of the Permanent Bureau on a General Convention on Enforcement of 
Judgments, in I HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
SEVENTEENTH SESSION 231, 235 (1995); Conclusions of the Working Group Meeting on Enforcement 
of Judgments, ibid. at 257. 
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other delegations, especially European ones, opposed the concept4 and 
preferred to work on a true double convention after the model of the 1968 
Brussels Convention5. The mixed convention model was ultimately adopted 
in a draft of 1999,6 but only half-heartedly and too late to save the project. 
Although the delegates have since concluded a much-reduced Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements,7 the much more ambitious early project of a full-
fledged judgment convention has failed, at least for the time being. In 
hindsight it appears delegates never fully understood the implications of the 
mixed convention and the possibilities it ensued.8 By presuming until the end 
that certain shapes of rules are somehow necessary, delegates did not realize 
the full array of possible rules. The failure of negotiations was the conse-
quence not only of policy differences, but also of a lack of conceptual clarity. 
Once, the analysis of rights suffered from a similar lack of conceptual clarity, 
and of erroneous perceptions that rights must take on a certain shape. These 
erroneous perceptions were dispelled by Wesley N. Hohfeld’s seminal work 
on the categorization of rights.9 Hohfeld’s analysis is purely analytical; his 
dissection of different kinds of what he calls jural relations has no direct 
implications for policies. This is why he has sometimes been thought of as a 
legal formalist without relevance for policies and social engineering10. The 
4 International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters – Report 
drawn up by Catherine Kessedjian, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW – 
ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, PREL. DOC. NO. 7 (April 1997), available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm_pd7.pdf, pp. 43-4, nos. 151-6. 
5 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and com-
mercial matters (consolidated version), 1998 O.J. C-27/1. 
6 See Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commer-
cial Matters, adopted by the Special Commission on 30 October 1999, available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgmpd11.pdf, Article 17; see also Report of the Special 
Commission drawn up by Peter Nygh and Fausto Pocar, ibid. at 19, 28-9. 
7 (Hague) Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (Concluded 30 June 2005), available at 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=98, published with an introductory 
note by Ronald A. Brand in 44 I.L.M. 1291 (2005). See Christian Thiele, The Hague Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements – Was it Worth the Effort?, in this volume, ____. 
8 Arthur T. von Mehren & Ralf Michaels, Pragmatismus und Realismus für die Haager 
Verhandlungen zu einem weltweiten Gerichtsstands- und Vollstreckungsübereinkommen, 25 DAJV-
NEWSLETTER 124, 127 (2000); Arthur T. von Mehren, The Hague Jurisdiction and Enforcement 
Convention Project Faces an Impasse – A Diagnosis and Guidelines for a Cure, 20 PRAXIS DES 
INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND PROZESSRECHTS [IPRAX] 465 (2000); Arthur T. von Mehren, Drafting, 
supra note 2, at 196-200.  
9 Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Legal Reasoning, 23 
YALE L.J. 16 (1913); reprinted in FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL 
REASONING BY WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD (David Campbell & Philip Thomas eds., 2001). 
10 See Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 711, 751-2 (1980); Nigel E. Simmonds, Introduction, in FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS, 
supra note 9, at x-xii. 
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opposite is true. "Hohfeld intended … not to resolve questions such as those 
which would interest the formalist, but to provide the fundamental analysis 
which he saw as an essential prerequisite to the resolution of such ques-
tions."11 Clear concepts do not guarantee proper policy debates, but without 
clear concepts policy debate is impossible.  
A similar conceptual analysis is still lacking from the law of jurisdiction, 
although it is urgently needed, as the failure of the Hague negotiations has 
arguably shown.12 This essay begins to fill this gap and do for the analysis of 
jurisdiction what Hohfeld has done for the analysis of rights. Its primary aim 
is analytical, not normative; it deals with concepts and their logical interrela-
tions, not with policies of jurisdiction and of recognition. Nonetheless, such 
an analysis has important implications for policy analysis. First, it shows that 
the array of possible categories of jurisdiction, and thus the possibilities for 
compromise, are considerably bigger than delegates and analysts have 
previously assumed. The article uses examples from numerous conventions 
to show that the various categories are not merely theoretical but actually 
exist. Second, the analysis makes it possible to isolate different policy 
considerations and thereby make a structured debate of different interests 
easier. In discussing the different concepts and categories, this article will 
point some of these interests out.  
II. FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS 
Hohfeld provided three important insights to the conceptualization and 
classification of rights. First, rights are not abstract attributes of rightholders. 
Rather, a right represents one side of a "jural relation" between persons, and 
the flipside of the rightholder's right is a certain position on the side of the 
oblige. Second, "right" can mean very different things. Hohfeld distinguished 
four types – rights (or claim-rights), privileges, powers and immunities. 
Especially important was the introduction of privileges and immunities where 
others had seen an absence of rights. It enabled Hohfeld to categorize every 
possible situation legally – there is no situation without jural relations. Third, 
11 Simmonds, supra note 10, at xii. 
12 Von Mehren himself did not lay out a full-fledged conceptual analysis, certainly due to his 
preference for pragmatism and policy debates over abstract conceptual discussions; see Peter D. 
Trooboff, In Memoriam: Arthur von Mehren, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1966, 1970-1 (2006). However, an 
invaluable conceptual presentation is von Mehren, Design, supra note 2; see also Arthur T. von 
Mehren, Jurisdictional Requirements: To What Extent should the State of Origin's Interpretation of 
Convention Rules Control for Recognition and Enforcement Purposes? (hereinafter von Mehren, 
Jurisdictional Requirements), in THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS A-29 
(Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Linda J. Silberman eds., 2001). 
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while relations of correlation and opposition exist between specific pairs,13 
other relations than those of correlation and of opposition are not intrinsic to 
rights. In particular, privileges and rights are independent from each other – 
a party may have a privilege of a certain conduct but no claim-right to enforce 
it, or a claim-right against others to refrain from interference but no privilege 
to engage in that conduct.14 
Jurisdiction is different from rights (although the legal relations it creates can 
be modeled in Hohfeldian terms). Nonetheless, von Mehren’s insights on the 
relation between jurisdiction and enforcement provide strikingly similar 
insights. This section will formalize these thoughts, and the concept of the 
mixed convention, in three separate steps. 
1. Required, Excluded, and Permitted Bases 
A first issue concerns the design of judgments conventions, more specifically 
the structure of rules on individual bases of jurisdiction. Different types of 
rules were not normally distinguished before von Mehren developed the 
mixed convention with the concepts of required, excluded and permitted 
bases of jurisdiction, or white, black, and gray zones.15  
Rules in the white zone require certain bases of jurisdiction.16 For example, 
Article 5(1) of the Brussels Regulation requires states to provide jurisdiction 
for contracts at the place of performance. Article 5 of the 1978 Hague 
Judgments Convention17 obliges member states to enforce foreign judgments 
if those judgments rested on one of the bases of jurisdiction listed in Articles 
10 and 11. Rules in the black zone exclude certain bases of jurisdiction. An 
example for a rule excluding bases of direct jurisdiction is Article 3(2) of the 
Brussels Regulation that explicitly excludes certain national exorbitant bases 
of direct jurisdiction. The Supplementary Protocol to the 1971 Hague 
13 For a table of these, see Simmonds, supra note 10, at xii. 
14 See ibid. at xix – xx. 
15 These three categories appear first in von Mehren, New Approach, supra note 2, 283. A 
different color scheme sometimes found (green, red, and yellow) was proposed by Andreas Lowenfeld, 
Thoughts About a Multinational Judgments Convention: A Reaction to the von Mehren Report, 57 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (1994). 
16 Whether a convention requires national legal systems to provide for certain bases, or whether a 
convention itself provides for these bases, is irrelevant for purposes of the analysis. 
17 Convention of 1 February 1971 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters, available at http://hcch.e-
vision.nl/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=78. 
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Judgments Convention18 contains, in its Article 4, a list of exorbitant bases of 
jurisdiction that Article 2(1) declares excluded from enforcement. 
Von Mehren’s important contribution was to show that there is a third, gray 
zone of jurisdictional bases which are neither required nor excluded: the 
permitted bases of jurisdiction. States to decide whether they want to adopt 
these bases or not. This freedom for states distinguishes these bases both 
from the required bases placed in the white category and from the excluded 
bases placed in the black category, both of which are binding on states. 
Permitted bases of direct jurisdiction leave it up to states whether they want 
to assert jurisdiction on the basis of certain criteria. Such rules had existed for 
quite some time. For example, Brussels Article 4(1) provides for permission 
of all bases of national law against defendants not domiciled in a member 
state. Nonetheless, before von Mehren introduced them in the context of the 
mixed convention, this category had largely escaped scholars’ attention. The 
reason may be that in the absence of regulation all bases of jurisdiction are 
permitted. Scholars may have wished to confine the notion of regulation to 
required and excluded bases, just as attention in the area of rights was long 
confined to duties and claim-rights, while liberties were ignored. But just as 
Hohfeld made clear that liberties are important legal relations, von Mehren 
made clear that permitted bases of jurisdiction create an important zone of 
jurisdictional bases. 
Although the importance of the gray category of permitted bases has often 
been emphasized, it becomes fully clear only once the analysis of jurisdic-
tional bases is linked to deontic logic. The three values – required, permitted, 
and excluded – reflect the traditional threefold classification of normative 
statuses in deontic logic of obligatory, optional, and impermissible.19 This 
means that, like the latter three categories in deontic logic, so required, 
permitted, and excluded contain all possible statuses of jurisdictional bases. 
Every jurisdictional basis must in every legal system, and in every convention, 
be either required, permitted, or excluded. This is true even for bases that are 
not explicitly regulated in the convention. 
Some conventions make the status of such bases explicit. For example, Article 
3(1) of the Brussels Regulation makes clear that, as against member states 
domiciliaries as defendants, all jurisdictional bases not required by the 
Convention are excluded. It follows logically that no other bases are permit-
ted; the explicit exclusion of certain bases in Article 3(2) does not add 
anything in this regard. Other conventions are not explicit, so interpretation 
18 Supplementary Protocol of 1 February 1971 to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, available at http://hcch.e-
vision.nl/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=79. 
19 For the relation between these three deontological categories and Hohfeld’s scheme, see 
Andrew Halpin, Fundamental Legal Conceptions Reconsidered, 16 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 41 (2003). 
 SOME FUNDAMENTAL JURISDICTIONAL CONCEPTIONS 7 
                                                          
is required to determine their exact substance. For example, Article 4(1) of 
the 1971 Hague Judgments Convention mentions only required bases of 
indirect jurisdiction.20 Whether other bases are permitted or excluded does 
not become clear from the wording alone. The uncertainty disappears, 
however, in view of the Protocol to the Convention, which adds a number of 
excluded bases of jurisdiction in its Article 4. Ordinary principles of interpre-
tation suggest that all bases that are neither explicitly required nor explicitly 
excluded are permitted. Whether interpretation is necessary or not does not 
change the mutual exclusivity of these three categories – ultimately, a basis 
can only have one of these three values. 
A quick look at policy impacts shows how helpful the gray category would 
have been for negotiations. Generally, required bases favor plaintiffs, while 
excluded bases favor defendants. Without the gray category of permitted 
bases, this means that delegates must not only agree for every basis of 
jurisdiction whether it is good and should be required, or whether it is bad 
and should be excluded; they must also always have the overall balance 
between plaintiffs and defendants in view. This is almost impossibly complex. 
By contrast, once bases can be left in the gray area, it becomes possible to 
negotiate over individual bases of jurisdiction without having to agree on 
every single one of them. This makes negotiations much easier and the 
consequences of conventions on the balance between plaintiff and defendant 
interests easier to predict. For example, delegates at the Hague perhaps spent 
an undue amount of time trying to find a basis for jurisdiction over corpora-
tions, instead of just leaving both the US basis of doing business and the 
European basis for subsidiaries in the gray area. 
2. Direct and Indirect Jurisdiction 
A second issue concerns the role that jurisdiction plays. The issue whether a 
court has adjudicatory jurisdiction21 can become relevant at two different 
stages. The first stage concerns the proceedings before the court that renders 
the original decision, hereinafter called the rendering court. The rendering 
court will not hear a case, much less render a decision, unless it determines 
that it has jurisdiction to do so.22 The second stage concerns the proceedings 
20 “A decision rendered in one of the Contracting States shall be entitled to recognition and 
enforcement in another Contracting State under the terms of this Convention – (1) if the decision was 
given by a court considered to have jurisdiction within the meaning of this Convention …” 
21 In using “adjudicatory jurisdiction” rather than "judicial jurisdiction", I follow Arthur T. von 
Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared and Evaluated, 63 B.U. L. REV. 279, 
282-3 (1983) (Adjudicatory Jurisdiction). 
22 If it renders a decision despite the lack of jurisdiction, an appellate court may declare the 
decision void. For the sake of simplicity, this is here treated as though the first instance court applied 
the law correctly. 
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before the court requested to recognize and/or enforce the, hereinafter the 
requested court.23 The requested court will not recognize or enforce the 
decision of the rendering court unless it determines that the rendering court 
had jurisdiction.24 
Use of the same term – jurisdiction – at both stages suggests uniformity of 
concepts. That suggestion may be illusory, just as the use of the term “right” 
conceals differences between different concepts. A conceptual clarification is 
needed. French law has found a particularly successful terminology to resolve 
this concern by distinguishing two concepts: direct jurisdiction (compétence 
directe) and indirect jurisdiction (compétence indirecte).25 Direct jurisdiction 
describes the question for the rendering court, since only the rendering court 
is directly engaged with the question whether it should exercise jurisdiction 
or not. Indirect jurisdiction describes the question for the requested court, 
since that court can control only indirectly,26 through the recognition 
procedure, whether jurisdiction was properly exercised or not. 
Of course the terminological distinction does not provide an answer to the 
substantive issue: Is the question whether the rendering court had jurisdic-
tion the same question when asked by the rendering and when asked by the 
requested court? And is the question the requested court asks for recognition 
purposes the same question it would ask if it were the adjudicating court?  
23 The second court must also decide whether it has direct jurisdiction over the enforcement 
litigation. This question is not part of the analysis here. See Dennis Solomon, Internationale 
Zuständigkeit zur Vollstreckbarerklärung ausländischer Entscheidungen – Divergierende 
Tendenzen in Deutschland und den Vereinigten Staaten, ___ DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT (AG) _____ 
(2006). 
24 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202; Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law § 482(1)(b) 
(1987). 
25 ETIENNE BARTIN, ETUDES SUR LES EFFETS INTERNATIONAUX DES JUGEMENTS 4-5 (1907); BARTIN, 
PRINCIPES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 317, § 127 (1930). Bartin distinguished only the concepts, 
not the relevant policies. For occasional use of this terminology in the US, see Arthur Nussbaum, 
Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 221, 225 (1941); 225; Ronald A. Brand, 
Enforcement of Judgments in the United States and Europe, 13 J.L. & COMMMERCE 193, 201-2 (1994); 
EUGENE F. SCOLES, PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS, SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT OF LAWS 288 
n.21 (4th ed. 2004); for occasional use in Germany, see JAN KROPHOLLER, INTERNATIONALES 
PRIVATRECHT 565 (4th ed. 2001); GERHARD KEGEL & KLAUS SCHURIG, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 
1062 (9th ed. 2004). 
Other terminologies are less successful. German lawyers distinguish between decision jurisdiction 
and recognition jurisdiction (Entscheidungszuständigkeit and Anerkennungszuständigkeit). See 
HAIMO SCHACK, INTERNATIONALES ZIVILVERFAHRENSRECHT 87, no. 187 (3rd ed. 2002). But “decision 
recognition” does not make clear sufficiently that what is at stake is the jurisdiction of the rendering, 
not that of the requested court. Another German proposal is to distinguish rules of conduct and rules 
of evaluation (Befolgungsregeln and Beurteilungsregeln). See WALTER JELLINEK, DIE ZWEISEITIGEN 
STAATSVERTRÄGE ÜBER ANERKENNUNG AUSLÄNDISCHER ZIVILURTEILE 26 (1953). But evaluation is a task 
of both the rendering and the recognizing court.  
26 SCOLES ET AL., supra note 25, at 288 (“indirect restraints on jurisdiction”). 
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Many authors assume the standard for direct and indirect jurisdiction to be 
the same;27 so do many legal orders.28 This is true for sister-state judgments 
in a federal or quasi-federal system29 under the U.S. Constitution30 and the 
Brussels Regulation31; it is true internationally for both the 1999 Hague 
Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments and 
the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. Lord Justice 
Hodson put the matter like this: “It must surely be that what entitles an 
English court to assume jurisdiction must be equally effective in the case of a 
foreign court.”32 Article 328(1) of the German Civil Code contains a similar 
reciprocity rule.33 
Take for example the famous Yahoo! case. A French court asserted jurisdic-
tion over the US corporation Yahoo! on the mere basis that its web site was 
accessible from French computers34. This contact was sufficient for jurisdic-
tion under French law but would likely not be sufficient under U.S. law.35 One 
27E.g. BARTIN, PRINCIPES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE, 317, 548 et seq. (1930); Paul Neuhaus, 
Internationales Zivilprozessrecht und Internationales Privatrecht, 20 RABELSZ 201, 225 (1955); 
REINHOLD GEIMER, ZUR PRÜFUNG DER GERICHTSBARKEIT UND DER INTERNATIONALEN ZUSTÄNDIGKEIT 
BEI DER ANERKENNUNG AUSLÄNDISCHER URTEILE 106 (1966); DOMINIQUE HOLLEAUX, COMPÉTENCE DU 
JUGE ÉTRANGER ET RECONNAISSANCE DES JUGEMENTS 121 (1970). GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL 
LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 970-1 (3rd ed. 1996) discusses indirect jurisdiction as a choice 
between the rendering and the requested court's law on direct jurisdiction. Von Mehren calls such 
approaches “derivative” theories: Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments – General Theory and the Role of Jurisdictional Requirements, 167 ACADEMY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, RECUEIL DES COURS (1980-II) 9, 56-7 (1980, published 1981) (hereinafter von 
Mehren, General Theory). 
28 See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1601, 1607 (1968). 
29 Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Sister-State Judgments: Reflections 
on General Theory and Current Practice in the European Economic Community and the United 
States, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1044 (1981). 
30 U.S. Const. Art. IV, § 1 (Full Faith and Credit Clause). 
31 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. L 12/1. 
32 Travers v. Holley, [1953] P. 246, 256 (C.A.). 
33 PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF STÜRNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE 530-2 (2004); specifically for U.S 
judgments, see Wolfgang Wurmnest, Recognition and Enforcement of U.S. Money Judgments in 
Germany, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 175, 186-8 (2005); CHRISTOPH SCHÄRTL, DAS SPIEGELBILDPRINZIP IM 
RECHTSVERKEHR MIT AUSLÄNDISCHEN STAATENVERBINDUNGEN UNTER BESONDERER BERÜCKSICHTIGUNG 
DES DEUTSCH-AMERIKANISCHEN RECHTSVERKEHRS 264-71 (2005). 
34 UEJF et Licra c. Yahoo ! Inc. et Yahoo France 22 mai 2000 (Tribunal de Grande Instance 
Paris), 2000 COMMUNICATION ET COMMERCE ELECTRONIQUE (COMM. COM. ÉLECTR. comm. n°92, note J-
Chr. Galloux; also available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20000522.htm; 
English translation available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/yauctions20000522.htm. 
35 For a comparison of European and US approaches, see Patrick J. Borchers, Tort and Contract 
Jurisdiction via the Internet: The ‘Minimum Contacts’ Test and the Brussels Regulation Compared, 
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question was whether the French court rightfully asserted jurisdiction, 
another, whether US courts would have to recognize and enforce the ensuing 
decision. Many commentators in the U.S. addressed both questions together. 
One set of commentators denied the French court’s jurisdiction over Yahoo, 
typically invoking not French law but either US law or some universal 
standards; these commentators consequently denied a duty of US courts to 
enforce the decision.36 Another set of commentators asserted that French 
courts had jurisdiction over Yahoo!, and US courts therefore had to recognize 
the ensuing decision37. Very few authors took the middle way, according to 
which French courts had jurisdiction according to French law, but US courts 
had no duty to enforce the ensuing decision under either US or international 
law. 
Yet, although it is of course possible to use the same standard, it is by no 
means necessary to do so,.38 A Hohfeldian reconception makes clear that 
direct and indirect jurisdiction are different and unconnected kinds of legal 
position. Between states, direct jurisdiction is a privilege –the courts of state 
A are free to exert direct jurisdiction, and state B has no right (the opposite of 
a privilege) that state A refrain from that jurisdiction. Indirect jurisdiction, by 
contrast, is a power – if the courts of state A have indirect jurisdiction, they 
bind the courts of state B with the ensuing judgment (a "liability" of state B in 
Hohfeldian terms). Powers and privileges can be connected in a legal system, 
but – this is important – there is no logical connection between them. The 
courts of state A may have direct but not indirect jurisdiction, and vice versa.  
This insight is important, because, assuming states are interested in maximiz-
ing their freedom to render decisions, a surprising asymmetry between 
indirect and direct jurisdiction exists. States are constrained more by 
excluded than by required bases of jurisdiction, but more by required than by 
excluded bases of indirect jurisdiction. Realizing that direct and indirect 
jurisdiction can be regulated differently opens up enormous possibilities for 
refined policy considerations,39 because it can account for this asymmetry. On 
the one hand, states may find it important to secure access to their courts and 
 
50 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 401 (2003). Note that the French decision in the Yahoo! case was based on 
French domestic law, not the Brussels Regulation. 
36 Cf. Marc H. Greenberg, A Return to Lilliput: The LICRA v. Yahoo! Case and the Regulation of 
Online Content in theWorld Market, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1191, 1205 (“Little will be accomplished if 
the boundaries of jurisdiction are expanded without concurrently expanding the ability to enforce 
judgments obtained in those foreign courts.”) 
37 Cf. Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining 
Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1819, 1879 (“…I think that the extent of 
Yahoo!’s business activities abroad justify the French judgment and should make it enforceable in the 
United States.”, emphases added). 
38 Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 28, at 1610-36; von Mehren, General Theory, supra note 
25. For an earlier very clear analysis, see Nussbaum, supra note 25.  
39 See the debate in von Mehren, General Theory, supra note 25, at 55-74. 
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therefore provide certain bases of direct jurisdiction, but accept that other 
states do not recognize ensuing decisions, and perhaps even reject foreign 
judgments rendered on such bases. Tag jurisdiction for human rights 
violation could be an example. On the other hand, states may be ready to 
accept certain bases of indirect jurisdiction, even though they do not use the 
same bases of direct jurisdiction – perhaps because they have other, func-
tionally equivalent, bases. 
It may be that the perceived need for symmetry was a problem for the Hague 
negotiations. For example, it seems plausible that European law contains 
more excluded bases both for direct and for indirect jurisdiction than US law. 
If this is so, then accepting an asymmetric convention would have enabled 
Europeans to agree to more required bases of indirect jurisdictions in return 
for the US agreeing to more excluded direct bases of jurisdiction. There was 
no need to agree on similar rules for both direct and indirect jurisdiction. 
3. Single and Double Conventions 
Both distinctions – that between required, excluded and permitted bases 
jurisdiction, and that between direct and indirect jurisdiction – come 
together in the design of judgments conventions. Traditionally, single and 
double conventions were distinguished. However, it is not always clear what 
these terms mean. Closer analysis reveals that two different understandings 
of the distinction are blurred in debate, understandings that can, but need 
not, coincide. 
In the first understanding, single conventions regulate only indirect jurisdic-
tion,40 while double conventions regulate both direct and indirect jurisdic-
tion. Single conventions in this sense were the standard type before the 
Brussels Regulation; the 1971 Hague Judgments Convention is but one of 
many examples. By contrast, the Brussels Convention provides the most 
important example of such a double Convention. Original plans had been for 
a single convention that would have regulated only indirect jurisdiction, as 
Article 220 of the EC Treaty provided.41 Yet a Belgian scholar, Martha Weser, 
managed to convince the drafters of the advantages of also regulating direct 
40 A convention that regulates only direct jurisdiction is a single convention in this sense as well, 
though these are rarely discussed. But see Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Theory and Practice of 
Adjudicatory Authority in Private International Law: A Comparative Study of the Doctrine, Policies 
and Practices of Common- and Civil-Law Systems, 295 RECUEIL DES COURS (2002) 9, 404-5 n.1300 
(2003) (hereinafter von Mehren, Theory and Practice); see also infra IV.2. 
41 Treaty Establishing the European Community (1957), Art. 220; 51 AM. J. INT’L L. 865 (1957): 
Member States shall, as far as necessary, engage in negotiations with each other with a view to 
ensuring for their nationals … the simplification of the formalities governing the reciprocal 
recognition and execution of judicial decision and arbitral awards. 
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jurisdiction,42 drawing on experience from earlier conventions to which 
Belgium was a party.43 As a consequence, the Brussels Convention and its 
successor, the Brussels Regulation, regulate both indirect and direct jurisdic-
tion, even though they do so by different techniques. Regarding direct 
jurisdiction, the Regulation contains individual specific bases in its Articles 2, 
5 ff. Regarding indirect jurisdiction, the Regulation contains no such list of 
individual bases, but rather regulates the issue implicitly: lack of indirect 
jurisdiction is not one of the grounds for non-recognition listed in Articles 34, 
35(1),44 and Article 35(1) makes clear that lack of indirect jurisdiction cannot 
even be invoked as a violation of public policy.45 
There is, however, a second understanding of the difference between simple 
and double conventions. It refers to the issue whether a convention only 
requires certain bases of jurisdiction – then it is a simple convention – or 
whether it also excludes certain bases of jurisdiction – then it is a double 
convention.46 The Hague Judgments Convention of 1971 and the Brussels 
Regulation provide good examples of this second understanding, too. The 
bases of jurisdiction required in Articles 10 and 11 of the 1971 Hague 
Convention are the only bases mentioned in the Convention, and the list is 
not mean to be exclusive. It follows that no bases of direct jurisdiction are 
excluded (or, put differently, all other bases are permitted). And no bases of 
indirect jurisdiction are excluded, either: if a judgment rests on a basis not 
included in Articles 10 and 11, the requested court is free, but not obliged, to 
deny jurisdiction. The Brussels Regulation is different in this regard. In 
addition to requiring certain bases of direct jurisdiction, it also excludes 
certain bases. Articles 2(1), 3(1) make clear that the required bases of direct 
42  See, especially, Martha Weser, Les Conflits de jurisdictions dans le cadre du Marché 
Commun. Difficultés et remèdes, published in six installments in 48 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL PRIVE (REV. CRIT.) 613 (1959), 49 REV. CRIT. 21, 151, 313, 533 (1960), 50 REV. CRIT. 195 
(1961); MARTHA WESER, CONVENTION COMMUNAUTAIRE SUR LA COMPETENCE JUDICIAIRE ET L’EXECUTION 
DES DECISIONS 49-84 (1975). On Weser’s influence see Arthur Bülow, Vereinheitlichtes Internationales 
Zivilprozessrecht in der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 29 RABELSZ 473, 479 n.18; GEORGES 
A.L. DROZ, COMPETENCE JUDICIAIRE ET EFFETS DES JUGEMENTS DANS LE MARCHE COMMUN 7-8 (1972); 
see also Pierre Bellet, L’Elaboration d’une Convention sur la Reconnaissance des Jugements dans le 
Cadre du Marché Commun, 92 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL (J.D.I.) 833, 846-7 (1965). 
43 Franco-Belgian Enforcement Treaty, Aug 8, 1899 (see MARTHA WESER, TRAITE FRANCO-BELGE 
DU 8 JUILLET 1899 (1951)); Belgian-Dutch Enforcement Treaty, Mar 28, 1925 ; Benelux Treaty, Nov. 
24, 1961. Martha Weser was prominently involved in the drafting both of the Benelux Treaty of 1961 
and, as observer, of the Brussels Convention. See Raymond Vander Elst, Préface, in WESER, 
CONVENTION COMMUNAUTAIRE, supra note 42, at IX. 
44 These are largely equivalent to Brussels Convention Arts. 27, 28(1). 
45 Case C-7/98, Krombach v. Bamberski, 2000 E.C.R. I-1935; (on Article 28(1) of the Brussels 
Convention); for Article 35(3), see Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Oct 6, 2005, 
IX ZB 27/02 (Ger.); for intertemporal applicability, see BGH March 30, 2006, IX ZB 102/04 (Ger.).  
46 Von Mehren, Design, supra note 2, at 19. Logically, a convention that only excludes certain 
bases of jurisdiction without requiring others would be a single convention in this sense as well. 
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jurisdiction listed in Articles 2, 5-24 are the only bases available against 
defendants domiciled in the EU; Article 3(2) in combination with Annex I 
explicitly declares certain national bases of jurisdiction inapplicable in this 
context. In other words, every basis of direct jurisdiction is either a required 
or an excluded basis. 
The examples show that both understandings can overlap. The 1971 Hague 
Convention is a simple convention in both senses of the word, and the 
Brussels Regulation is a double convention in both senses of the word. 
Perhaps the respective overlap of both concepts of single and double 
conventions respectively is no coincidence. Delegates may be psychologically 
inclined to enter into negotiations that combine either the simple or the 
double character in both senses. Thus, it may seem to make little sense to 
exclude certain bases of jurisdiction from conventions that deal merely with 
indirect jurisdiction. After all, the goal of such conventions is to make 
enforceability easier rather than harder. On the other hand, it may seem to 
make sense to devise lists of required bases of jurisdiction in conventions 
dealing with both direct and indirect jurisdiction. 
Yet psychological inclinations can stand in the way of recognizing logical 
connections and possibilities, and logically, both criteria are independent of 
each other. It is possible to create a convention that deals only with indirect 
jurisdiction (simple convention in the first sense) but does so by both 
requiring some and excluding other bases of jurisdiction (double convention 
in the second sense). Similarly, it is possible to create a convention that deals 
with both direct and indirect jurisdiction (double convention in the first 
sense) but does so by only requiring some, not excluding other bases of 
jurisdiction (simple convention in the second sense). 
4. Mixed Conventions 
This double meaning creates problems for the concept of a mixed convention 
that have so far gone unnoticed. A mixed convention claims a middle position 
between single and double conventions. But where the concepts of single and 
double conventions are ambivalent, such a middle position is impossible to 
determine. Rather, two criteria compete. The first meaning of “mixed” places 
the mixed convention between “simple conventions” in the sense that they 
regulate only indirect jurisdiction and “double conventions” in the sense that 
they regulate both direct and indirect jurisdiction. In this sense, a mixed 
convention regulates only indirect (or only direct) jurisdiction for some, both 
direct and indirect jurisdiction for other jurisdictional bases. The second 
meaning of “mixed” places the mixed convention between “simple conven-
tions” in the sense that they require some and permit other bases, and 
“double conventions” in the sense that they both exclude and require certain 
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bases, by providing for all three categories: required, permitted, and excluded 
bases.47 A third possibility would be to combine these criteria and to call a 
convention “mixed” if it is mixed in either of the two senses defined before. 
Under this approach, simple and double conventions are considered not as 
whole categories but rather as “two extremes of a spectrum”.48 
This ambiguity severely impairs debates on mixed conventions. Obviously, 
the terminology is both confused and confusing. First, it is not possible to 
place each possible convention in one or the other category. For example, is 
an enforcement convention that contains only required and excluded but no 
permitted bases of jurisdiction a single convention, because it regulates only 
enforcement? Or is it a double convention, because it contains rules on 
required and on excluded bases but nothing else? Second, the definitions of 
the category are not always conclusive. Even von Mehren has explained 
required bases of indirect jurisdiction in a double convention at one time as 
permitted bases of direct jurisdiction,49 another time as required bases of 
direct jurisdiction.50 The practical difference can be considerable. Third, it is 
hard to discuss the possible substance of a mixed convention and the policy 
advantage without a clear idea of what it is. The European opposition to the 
mixed convention may well have been a reaction to such a perceived lack of 
clarity. This makes clarification desirable. 
III. THE NINE POSSIBLE CATEGORIES FOR BASES OF JURISDICTION 
If the concepts of simple and double conventions overlap, and if almost all 
conventions are mixed conventions in one sense or the other, then these three 
categories of conventions as currently used are not optimal from an analytical 
perspective and alternative categories are needed. Given that conventions can 
contain differently structured rules, it makes sense to focus instead on 
individual jurisdictional bases. 
47 Ibid. at 19. One could also have named conventions with three different types of jurisdictional 
bases “triple conventions”. 
48 von Mehren, Theory and Practice, supra note 40, at 406. 
49 von Mehren, New Approach, supra note 2, 282 (“a ‘white list’ detailing all the bases on which 
[direct] jurisdiction may be predicated.”, emphasis added); similarly Patrick J. Borchers, Book 
Review, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 995, 996 (2005) (“permissible”), emphases added. For some unclarity 
regarding the Hague project, see International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters - Report drawn up by Catherine Kessedjian, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW – ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, PREL. DOC. NO. 7 (April 1997), available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm_pd7.pdf, p. 11, no. 19; see also Haimo Schack, Perspektiven 
eines weltweiten Anerkennungs- und Vollstreckungsübereinkommens, 1 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT [ZEUP] 306, 316 (1993). 
50 von Mehren, Design, supra note 2, 19 (“Each Contracting State is required to make available 
and … to exercise certain bases of jurisdiction in the international sense,” emphasis added) 
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Usually, the debate is about whether there are only two values of jurisdiction 
– required and excluded – or whether a third one should be accepted – 
permitted. For example, while  the Brussels Regulation contains only 
required and excluded bases,  the 1999 Hague Draft Convention contains 
provisions for all three values: Articles 3-16 govern required, Article 1751 
governs permitted, and Article 1852 governs excluded bases of direct jurisdic-
tion. Integrating indirect jurisdiction does not add to the number of catego-
ries, since the three lists of indirect jurisdiction in the draft convention are 
mere extensions of the three lists of direct jurisdiction: a required basis of 
direct jurisdiction is also a required basis of indirect jurisdiction (Article 
25)53; a permitted basis of direct jurisdiction is also a permitted basis of 
indirect jurisdiction (Article 24)54, and an excluded basis of direct jurisdiction 
is also an excluded basis of indirect jurisdiction (Article 26)55. The Draft 
Convention thus contains only three different categories of jurisdictional 
bases: some bases are required both for direct and indirect jurisdiction, some 
are permitted for both, and some are excluded for both. 
This debate over two or three possible values is insufficient. It does not nearly 
exhaust all possibility, because it does not account for the possibility of 
treating direct and indirect jurisdiction separately. Once we do this, we see 
that two dimensions must be distinguished. The first dimension to be 
distinguished is the value that each basis of jurisdiction can take: required, 
permitted, and excluded. The second dimension is the kind of jurisdiction 
regulated, direct or indirect jurisdiction. It follows, in a first step, that a 
convention can contain six different categories: required, permitted, and 
51 Article 17 (Jurisdiction based on national law) provides:  
Subject to Articles 4, 5, 7, 8, 12 and 13, the Convention does not prevent the application by 
Contracting States of rules of jurisdiction under national law, provided that this is not prohibited 
under Article 18.  
52 Article 18 (Prohibited Grounds of Jurisdiction) provides:  
1. Where the defendant is habitually resident in a Contracting State, the application of a rule of 
jurisdiction provided for under the national law of a Contracting State is prohibited if there is no 
substantial connection between that State and the dispute.  
2. In particular, jurisdiction shall not be exercised by the courts of a Contracting State on the basis 
solely of one or more of the following [followed by a list of exorbitant bases]. 
53 Art. 25 (Judgments to Be Recognized or Enforced) provides in its first paragraph: 
A judgment based on a ground of jurisdiction provided for in Articles 3 to 13, or which is consis-
tent with any such ground, shall be recognised or enforced under this Chapter. 
54 Article 24 (Judgments Excluded from Chapter III) provides: 
This Chapter shall not apply to judgments based on a ground of jurisdiction provided for by 
national law in accordance with Article 17. 
55 Article 26 (Judgments not to Be Recognized or Enforced) provides: 
A judgment based on a ground of jurisdiction which conflicts with Articles 4, 5, 7, 8 or 12, or 
whose application is prohibited by virtue of Article 18, shall not be recognized or enforced.  
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excluded bases for direct jurisdiction, and required, permitted, and excluded 
bases for indirect jurisdiction.56  
However, once we combine direct and indirect jurisdiction, we see in a second 
step that the number of possible categories is greater than either three or six. 
Each basis of jurisdiction can exist in two kinds – as direct and indirect basis. 
Within each kind, each basis can take on one of three values – it can be 
required, permitted, or excluded. Taken together, this means that each basis 
of jurisdiction can, logically, take one of nine (32) different forms. The 
following table illustrates this. The rows represent the three different values a 
jurisdictional bas can take for direct jurisdiction; the columns represent the 
three different values a jurisdictional base can take for indirect jurisdiction. 
In each box, the first value represents direct, the second indirect jurisdiction. 
 









































Table 1: Nine possible values of jurisdictional bases 
 
This shows that drafters of Conventions have a far greater variety of catego-
ries to choose from for bases of jurisdiction – not just two (as in the Brussels 
Regulation) or three (as in the 1999 Hague Draft Convention), but actually 
nine. Delegates need not link direct and indirect jurisdiction. Rather, they can 
decide for each basis of jurisdiction whether it should be required, excluded, 
or permitted, both for indirect and direct jurisdiction. This finding considera-
bly enhances the possibilities of delegates because it provides them with a 
considerably greater arsenal of possibilities. Moreover, delegates know that 
these nine boxes represent all logically possible categories of bases of 
jurisdiction.  
                                                          
56 See already von Mehren, Jurisdictional Requirements, supra note 12, at A-37-40. 
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Importantly, these nine categories are not just abstract possibilities. To show 
this, the remainder of this section will illustrate each of them with explication 
and examples, and start to extrapolate the policies underlying each category.  
1. Required-Required 
The first category comprises bases that are required for both direct and 
indirect jurisdiction. All bases of jurisdiction listed in Articles 2, 5 ff. of the 
Brussels Regulation are in this category. Member states must provide these 
bases for direct jurisdiction,57 and they must enforce decisions based on these 
grounds (Art. 33, 35(3)). Similarly congruent solutions can be found in other 
conventions.58 U.S. constitutional law contains fewer required bases of direct 
jurisdiction, though such bases do exist where the U.S. Supreme Court 
invokes a state’s duty to provide a forum59. Since the full faith and credit 
clause obliges other states to enforce such judgments, these bases are also 
required for indirect jurisdiction. 
Required-required bases of jurisdiction provide the most attractive situation 
possible for plaintiffs: they are guaranteed both that a certain basis of direct 
jurisdiction exists, and that judgments rendered on these grounds will be 
enforced elsewhere. Consequently, where delegates agree that a certain basis 
is desirable, making it required-required is a way to channel litigation to 
these bases and thus away from other, exorbitant bases of jurisdiction that 
may merely be permitted-permitted60. 
2. Required-Permitted 
The second category of jurisdictional bases is rarer: bases that are required 
for direct, but only permitted for indirect jurisdiction. One example can be 
found in the 1965 Hague Convention on Choice of Court.61 While it makes 
57 This rules out even application of the forum non conveniens doctrine: Case C-281/02, Owusu v. 
Jackson, 2005 E.C.R. I- 1383, no. 37. 
58 See, e.g., Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 29th July 1960 
as amended by the Additional Protocol of 28th January 1964 and by the Protocol of 16th November 
1982, Article 13(a) and (d), available at available at http://www.nea.fr/html/law/nlparis_conv.html.; 
Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR) art. 31(1)  and (3), 
399 U.N.T.S. 189. 
59 Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951). 
60 von Mehren, Design, supra note 2, at 27. 
61 Convention of 25 November 1965 on the Choice of Court, ailable at http://hcch.e-
vision.nl/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=77. For another example, see Inter-American 
Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods by Road, art. 15, available at 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-55.htm. 
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choice by the parties a required basis for direct jurisdiction, it does not 
require other states to enforce ensuing judgments – Article 8 only mandates 
that such judgments shall be recognized and enforced in accordance with 
national rules.62 
Required-permitted bases can make sense as an extension of substantive law 
unification, where delegates want to make sure member states back up the 
unified substantive law with the provision of effective protection in the 
courts, but cannot or do not want to regulate enforcement at the same time. 
3. Required-Excluded 
The third category of jurisdiction seems counterintuitive: bases that are 
required for direct jurisdiction, but excluded for indirect jurisdiction. Yet an 
example can be found. The Paris Convention of 29 July 1960 on Third Party 
Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy63 provides, in its Article 13(a), for 
exclusive direct jurisdiction in the country where the nuclear incident 
occurred, and makes ensuing judgments enforceable in other member states 
under its Article 13(d). Article 13(e) bars governments from raising the 
defense of sovereign immunity against actions brought under Article 13(a), 
but not against measures of enforcement. In other words, as against state 
agencies, Article 13 gives both a required basis of direct and an excluded basis 
of indirect jurisdiction.64 
A required-excluded basis makes sense where litigation is on the one hand 
encouraged, so a forum should be provided, but on the other hand the forum 
state should be the only state where the decision should be enforced. Such a 
conception simultaneously ensures that victims of governmental acts find a 
forum for their claims, and that governments maintain their governmental 
immunity vis-à-vis other countries. 
4. Permitted-Required 
Bases that are permitted for direct and required for indirect jurisdiction form 
a typical category in simple enforcement conventions, which leave all bases of 
direct jurisdiction in the gray zone of permitted bases while requiring 
member states to enforce judgments based on certain required bases of 
indirect jurisdiction. Articles 10, 11 of the 1971 Hague Judgments Convention 
contain such bases. The same is true in the U.S. for jurisdictional bases 
62 See von Mehren, Theory and Practice, supra note 40, at 405 n.1300. 
63  Supra, note 58. 
64 To be precise, indirect jurisdiction is excluded only against measures of enforcement, not 
against recognition of foreign judgments. 
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permissible under the due process clause of the Constitution. Such bases are 
only permitted, not required: no state is required to offer jurisdiction up to 
the limits of the Constitution, and some states indeed restrict jurisdiction 
further65. However, decisions rendered by a state in accordance both with 
domestic law and the due process are entitled to full faith and credit in other 
states, another way of saying that these bases are required bases of indirect 
jurisdiction. Finally, Article 4 of the Brussels Regulation turns all jurisdic-
tional bases of member state laws into permitted-required bases of direct 
jurisdiction66. The Brussels Regulation does not require France, for example, 
to provide jurisdiction for French plaintiffs – Article 4(2) only requires 
France to treat foreigners domiciled in France the same way as it does French 
nationals. However, decisions based on such grounds remain enforceable in 
other member states; the defense of lack of jurisdiction is unavailable. It 
follows that with regard to domiciliaries of non-member states, not even the 
Brussels Regulation is therefore a “true” double convention.67 
Given the rage Article 4 has raised especially among US commentators68, the 
origin of the provision may provide a good example for a situation in which a 
permitted-required basis seemed appropriate. Besides feeling that compe-
tence for direct jurisdiction against third country domiciliaries was lacking, 
drafters expected the number of cases in which decisions based on exorbitant 
direct grounds in one member state would be recognized in another was to 
remain too small to justify an exception from the rule that all indirect bases of 
jurisdiction are required in order to provide for free movement of judg-
ments69. This insight can be generalized. Permitted-required bases are 
attractive where a free movement of judgments is desired, while a unification 
of direct bases seems unnecessary because the permitted bases are thought to 
be relatively harmless. 
65 For an overview, see Douglas D. McFarland, Dictum Run Wild: How Long-Arm Statutes 
Extended to the Limits of Due Process, 84 B.U. L. REV. 491, 525-6 (2004) 
66 As articulated clearly by von Mehren, Sister-State Judgments, supra note 29, 1058: “the State 
of origin is entirely free to use any basis for assuming jurisdiction that it chooses, however unfair or 
unreasonable, while the State addressed cannot impose a jurisdictional requirement but must 
recognize the resulting judgment.” 
67 Von Mehren, Design, supra note 2, at 20. 
68 E.g. Kurt Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper Fora in Treaties on Recognition of Judg-
ments: The Common Market Draft, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1004-6 (1967); von Mehren, Sister-State 
Judgments, supra note 29, 1057-60; Friedrich K. Juenger, La Convention de Bruxelles du 27 
septembre 1968 et la courtoisie internationale. Réflexions d'un américain, 71 REV. CRIT. 37, 41-51 
(1983); Juenger, Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States and in the European Communities: A 
Comparison, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1211-2 (1984). 
69 See Michaels, Two Paradigms, supra note 1, at ___ with further references. 
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5. Permitted-Permitted 
The central category of jurisdictional bases is the permitted-permitted 
category: jurisdictional bases that are neither required nor excluded for either 
direct or indirect jurisdiction. Conventions traditionally do not contain 
explicit rules for such bases; the Brussels Regime explicitly avoided any such 
category in its Article 3. By contrast, the 1999 draft Hague Judgments 
Convention explicitly provides for a gray category of permitted bases for 
direct jurisdiction in its Article 1770 and makes clear in its Article 2471 that 
member states remain free to enforce judgments based on such grounds or 
not.  
In a sense, however, conventions with a more limited scope also leave 
permitted-permitted bases of jurisdiction, namely in the unregulated areas. 
For example, the 2005 Hague Choice-of-Court convention governs only 
jurisdiction based on exclusive choice of court agreements. At least under this 
Convention, non-exclusive choice of court agreements are merely permitted 
both for direct and indirect jurisdiction;72 the same is true for all bases 
determined through objective criteria. It seems not fully consistent, therefore, 
if European authors criticized the American proposal of a Hague Convention 
as overly ambitious for trying to regulate all bases of jurisdiction, and 
simultaneously feared that the gray list of permitted bases may become too 
long. All bases of jurisdiction are necessarily regulated in one of the nine 
ways here described. Ironically, by trying to keep the gray list in the broader 
Hague Convention as small as possible, Europeans ended up with a far 
greater gray list than the gray list in 1999 would have been. 
This suggests the policy behind such bases: to leave states the greatest 
freedom possible on controversial bases, because either no agreement can be 
reached or matters should be left to further development.73 The permitted-
permitted category constitutes the state of nature against which all negotia-
tions towards conventions take place.74 
70 Supra note 51. 
71 Supra note 54. 
72 Art. 22 enables reciprocal declarations between states that would turn such agreements into a 
permitted-required basis of jurisdiction. 
73 Von Mehren, Case, supra note 2, at 91-2. 
74 Infra IV.1 
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6. Permitted-Excluded 
Permitted-excluded bases of jurisdiction are frequent in single enforcement 
conventions. A good example is, again, the list of exorbitant bases of jurisdic-
tion in Article 4 of the Supplementary Protocol to the 1971 Hague Judgments 
Convention. Article 2(1) declares these bases excluded for enforcement 
purposes. Yet since neither the Convention nor the supplementary protocol 
regulate direct jurisdiction at all, these bases of direct jurisdiction remain 
permitted as regards direct jurisdiction. By contrast, the Brussels Regulation 
and the 1999 Hague Draft Convention contain no permitted-excluded bases 
of jurisdiction. Under the Brussels Regulation, all bases are required for 
indirect jurisdiction; under the Hague regime, direct and indirect jurisdiction 
are symmetric, so what is permitted for direct jurisdiction is permitted also 
for indirect jurisdiction. 
This insight can be generalized. Permitted-excluded bases make sense for 
conventions that regulate only the enforcement of judgments. While it may 
seem unusual in two-country relations that country A would demand from 
country B to refrain from enforcing country A’s judgments, it is not implausi-
ble to conceive in multi-party relations that country A would want country B 
to refrain from enforcing judgments rendered in country C. Indeed, such a 
protection, permitted by Article 59 of the Brussels Convention,75 constituted 
the prime interest the U.S. had in negotiating a bilateral enforcement treaty 
with the U.K. – to prevent the UK from enforcing judgments from other EU 
member states rendered on exorbitant bases of jurisdiction.76 Article 18 of the 
ensuing draft convention provides precisely such a rule.77 
75 Brussels Regulation art. 72 maintains the exception, but only for conventions agreed upon 
before the Regulation went into force.  
76 Von Mehren, Sister-State Judgments, supra note 29, at 1059-60. 
77 Reprinted in David Luther Woodward, Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Civil 
Judgments in the United States,. the United Kingdom and the European Economic Community, 8 
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. 299, 322 (1982/83). Article 18 (1) provides: 
Subject to any obligations under a treaty existing at the date of entry into force of this Convention 
or arising as a result of the accession of further States to such a treaty, a judgment given by a court 
of other authority of a third State against a person who is a national of a Contracting State or who 
has a domicile, a place of residence or a place of business, or which is incorporated or has its 
registered office, in a Contracting State shall be refused recognition or enforcement by the courts 
of the other Contracting State at the request of the respondent: 
(a) where, pursuant to a treaty obligation, the courts of the third State would be precluded 
from exercising jurisdiction in proceedings against a person having the same connection 
with the State of the court addressed as the person sued had with the other Contracting 
State, or 
(b) where the judgment would, if it had been given against a person having the same con-
nection with the State of the court addressed, be denied recognition or enforcement on 
jurisdictional grounds or because proper notice was not given. 
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7. Excluded-Required 
Although jurisdictional bases that are excluded for purposes of direct and 
required for purposes of indirect jurisdiction seem counterintuitive, ex-
cluded-required bases are a frequent occurrence. Whenever requested courts 
are barred from controlling for indirect jurisdiction, all bases of indirect 
jurisdiction become required bases. This is the situation under Brussels 
Regulation Art. 35(3),78 as the European Court of Justice made clear in its 
Krombach decision.79 A French court had asserted direct jurisdiction based 
on the plaintiff’s French nationality, a direct basis excluded under the 
Brussels Regulation. Although this basis was excluded for the purpose of 
direct jurisdiction, the requested German court was barred from invoking the 
lack of indirect jurisdiction as a barrier to recognition. (Note that under the 
Brussels Regulation, some other bases that are excluded for direct jurisdic-
tion are also excluded for indirect jurisdiction, namely those regarding 
insurance and consumer contracts and exclusive jurisdiction, Art. 35(1)). 
The Brussels setting suggests what policies underlie excluded-required bases. 
Where the interest in a free movement of judgments is paramount, as it is in 
the European Union, the risk that judgments based on excluded direct bases 
of jurisdiction must be enforced may be deemed lower than the risk of 
frequent litigation over indirect jurisdiction before the requested court. The 
risk is smaller here than for permitted-required bases, since if a basis is 
excluded as a direct basis, the requested court can trust that only very few 
judgments based erroneously on such a direct basis will have to be recog-
nized. Furthermore, the European Court of Justice can control the exercise of 
direct jurisdiction.80 By contrast, where such strong control at the rendering 
stage does not exist, or where it is insufficient, excluded-required bases are 
more problematic. 
8. Excluded-Permitted 
Bases that are excluded for purposes of direct but permitted for purposes of 
indirect jurisdiction seem counterintuitive, but they exist, especially in 
conventions that regulate only direct jurisdiction. For example, where parties 
have chosen a forum, Article 6 of the 1965 Hague Choice of Court Convention 
excludes all other bases of direct jurisdiction, but it does not simultaneously 
78 von Mehren, Jurisdictional Requirements, supra note 12, at A-37. 
79 Supra note 45. For a lucid presentation of the whole Krombach affair, see Andreas F. 
Lowenfeld, Jurisdiction, Enforcement, Public Policy and Res Judicata: The Krombach Case, in 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION THROUGH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW – ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF PETER 
E. NYGH 229 (2004). 
80 von Mehren, Jurisdictional Requirements, supra note 12, at A-29-34. 
 SOME FUNDAMENTAL JURISDICTIONAL CONCEPTIONS 23 
                                                          
exclude recognition of decisions that may nonetheless be grounded on such a 
basis. 
This suggests one policy behind such bases: to protect defendants from 
litigation, when enforcement seems a negligible risk. Excluded-permitted 
bases can prevent a tragedy of the commons: States have a mutual interest in 
avoiding a race to the bottom in which states compete for plaintiffs by 
offering ever more exorbitant bases of jurisdiction,81 yet they may not want to 
exclude enforcement at the same time. A second policy is the following: 
Where a jurisdictional basis is excluded only for the sake of another state, it is 
sufficient to protect that other state with a permitted basis of indirect 
jurisdiction. In Williams v. North Carolina (II),82 the U.S. Supreme Court had 
to decide whether North Carolina must recognize and enforce a divorce 
decree that a Nevada court had granted, likely without having jurisdiction 
(i.e. on an excluded direct basis83). The Court, held that “North Carolina was 
not required to yield her State policy…”84 which seems to imply that North 
Carolina was very well permitted to yield this policy by enforcing the decree – 
the bases was permitted for indirect jurisdiction. 
9. Excluded-Excluded 
Finally, there are bases of jurisdiction that are excluded for purposes both of 
direct and of indirect jurisdiction. Such bases do not exist under the Brussels 
Regime, where all bases are required bases for indirect jurisdiction (with the 
exceptions of insurance and consumer matters and of exclusive direct 
jurisdiction, Article 35(1)). They are frequent, however, in other double 
conventions. One such example can be found in Article 26 of the 1999 Hague 
Draft Convention, which mirrors the excluded character of bases of direct 
jurisdiction into indirect jurisdiction.85 
Excluded-excluded bases provide the maximal protection both for defendants 
and for countries other than that of the rendering court. By making a 
jurisdictional basis excluded-excluded, a convention provides a double check 
that that basis will not be used – first at the stage of the decision, then again 
at the enforcement stage. This is the strongest way convention delegates have 
of ruling a certain basis out. 
81 Ibid. 404 n.1300. 
82 325 U.S. 226 (1945). 
83 This is a slight simplification from the actual case. 
84 325 U.S. at 239.  
85 Supra note 55. 
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IV. A NEW TYPOLOGY OF CONVENTIONS 
Although all nine categories are available, many conventions do not make use 
of all of them. This makes it both possible and worthwhile to devise a 
typology of such conventions that is both richer and more precise than the 
trilogy of single, double and mixed conventions. Such a typology can prove 
helpful in mapping different conventions, in comparing and evaluating them, 
and in devising new conventions. 
1. State of Nature 
The first type of convention describes the absence of a convention – the state 
of nature, where all jurisdictional bases are permitted-permitted. Theoreti-
cally this could be the substance of a convention, which would provide that 
each member state is permitted to use or not to use any basis of jurisdiction. 
However, such a convention would not regulate anything beyond the state of 
the law without the convention – the “state of nature” of jurisdiction, so to 
speak. For the purpose of clarity in the following analysis, this special type of 
conventions will be considered not to be a convention. 
Nonetheless, it is crucial to see that the state of nature, in which all jurisdic-
tional bases are prior to any conventions, is not categorically different from 
the state in which a convention exists. Far from being an anomaly, is instead 
the default status of all jurisdictional bases.86 If von Mehren calls permitted 
bases of jurisdiction “unregulated”,87 this term should not be read to suggest 
that permitted bases lie somewhere outside the scope of the law. “Unregu-
lated” is a special category of regulation, too; it just describes what one could 
call the “state of nature” of jurisdiction. In the parallel study of rights 
analysis, the state of nature is a state not without legal relations but rather 
one with only a restricted set of such relations.88 Similarly, when the state of 
nature of jurisdiction is described as “unregulated”, this suggests not the lack 
of legal relations but rather a situation made up of only permitted bases of 
jurisdiction.89 The state of nature is the background against which all 
negotiations take place, and it is the residual state for all areas in which no 
agreement can be reached. 
Obviously, the state of nature leaves states maximum freedom regarding both 
exercise of jurisdiction and recognition of foreign judgments, but it leaves the 
86 Von Mehren, Design, supra note 2, at 27-8; von Mehren & Michaels, supra note 8, at 127. 
87 Von Mehren, Design, supra note 2, at 25, speaks of “mixed double conventions”. 
88 Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 10, at 754-7. 
89 See supra part III.5 
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reach of their judgments to the mercy of other states. Conventions are 
negotiated not because of a desire for regulation, but rather because states see 
a mutual benefit if they exchange this maximum amount of freedom for a 
greater power of their decisions. 
2. Single and Double Conventions 
A first important typological distinction mirrors the traditional distinction 
between single and double conventions in the first sense discussed before:90 
single conventions regulate only either jurisdiction or enforcement and 
double conventions that regulate both. Since such single conventions can 
come in two versions, depending on whether they regulate jurisdiction or 
enforcement,91 it is more fruitful to distinguish three types: (single) jurisdic-
tion, (single) enforcement, and double conventions. 
(Single) jurisdiction conventions contain rules only on direct jurisdiction; all 
bases of indirect jurisdiction are permitted. In single jurisdiction conventions, 
all bases of jurisdiction are in boxes 2, 5, and 8. (Single) enforcement 
conventions contain rules only on indirect jurisdiction; all bases of direct 
jurisdiction are permitted. In single enforcement conventions, all bases of 





























Table 2: Single conventions  
 
 Possible bases in a single jurisdiction convention 
 Possible bases in a single enforcement convention 
                                                          
90 Supra part II.3. 
91 Supra note 40. 
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Double conventions by contrast contain rules both on direct and on indirect 
jurisdiction. This means, at least one basis of direct jurisdiction and one basis 
of indirect jurisdiction must be either required or excluded. In other words, 
the convention must have at least one basis of jurisdiction in the upper or in 
the lower row of the table or in both (boxes 1-3 and 7-9), and at least one 
basis of jurisdiction in the left or in the right column of the table or both 
(boxes 1, 4, 7, or 3, 6, 9). In this sense, the “mixed” convention as proposed by 
the US delegation for the Hague Judgments Project is a double convention, 
too.92 The Hague Choice of Court Convention is a double convention although 
it only requires one basis of jurisdiction – jurisdiction based on an exclusive 
choice-of-court agreement – because this basis is required both for direct and 
indirect jurisdiction (box 1). 
The analysis illustrates how the double meaning of single and double 
conventions mentioned earlier mars debates: simple and double conventions 
are often used as incommensurable categories. For example, the Brussels 
Regulation, often named as the model of a double convention, combines all 
jurisdictional bases in the left column – boxes 1, 4, and 9. By contrast, a 
simple enforcement convention does not cover a whole column but rather a 
whole row; it combines all three bases in the middle column – boxes 4, 5, and 
6. In this sense, double convention and simple convention are incommensur-
able, they concern different dimensions of jurisdictional bases. 
Much has been written about the policies behind single and double conven-
tions. Arthur von Mehren in particular pointed out that double conventions 
have two requirements that are met both within the EU and within the US: 
great economic, cultural and legal similarities between the states or countries 
involved, and a supreme institution (the US Supreme Court viz. the European 
Court of Justice) to enforce jurisdictional standards in a universal manner.93 
In such settings they are attractive because they provide maximum security, 
while making the enforcement process easy. Single enforcement conventions, 
by contrast, make sense between countries which are interdependent but lack 
both strong economic and political bonds and a supreme court.94 More 
generally speaking, while single enforcement conventions tend to favor 
plaintiffs, double conventions provide a fuller regime and can therefore 
provide more information and more balance.95 
92 See von Mehren, Design, supra note 2, at 19. 
93 Ibid.  
94 Von Mehren, Drafting, supra note 2, at 197. 
95 von Mehren, Design, supra note 2, at 23-4. 
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3. Pure and Mixed Conventions  
A second distinction draws on whether a convention contains only required 
and excluded bases, or whether it contains permitted bases. In the latter case, 
it is a mixed convention; in the first case, it will be called, in accordance with 
von Mehren’s use of the word,96 a pure convention. 
Pure conventions are conventions in which all regulated bases are either 
required or permitted. Combined with the typology of single and double 
conventions developed before (sub 2.), there are three types of pure conven-
tions. In pure jurisdiction conventions, all bases are either required or 
excluded for direct jurisdiction; all bases are therefore in categories 2 and 8.97 
In pure enforcement conventions, all bases are either required or excluded 
for indirect and permitted for direct jurisdiction; all jurisdictional bases are 
therefore in boxes 4 and 6.98 In pure double conventions, finally, all jurisdic-
tional bases are either required or excluded for both direct and indirect 
jurisdiction;99 all bases are therefore in boxes 1, 3, 7 and 9. The Brussels 
Regulation is a pure double convention with regard to defendants domiciled 





























Table 3: Pure Conventions  
 
 Pure jurisdiction convention 
                                                          
96 Ibid. at 25 (also called “full-fledged”). 
97 That all indirect bases are permitted is irrelevant for the character of a pure convention, the 
“pure” attribute in a pure jurisdiction convention concerns only bases of direct jurisdiction. 
98 Again, that all bases are permitted for direct jurisdiction does not change the pure character. 
99 Von Mehren, Design, supra note 2, 19 
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 Pure enforcement convention 
 Pure double convention 
By contrast, mixed conventions are conventions that contain bases of 
permitted jurisdiction in addition to required and excluded bases of direct or 
indirect jurisdiction.100 For single conventions, whether jurisdiction or 
enforcement conventions, this means that at least one basis of jurisdiction 
must be in box 5. Double conventions are mixed conventions if they contain a 
list of permitted bases either for direct or for indirect jurisdiction. The 1999 
Hague Draft Convention is a mixed double convention. 
Again, Arthur von Mehren has compared the advantages of pure and of mixed 
conventions.101 The great advantage of a pure convention is its clarity 
regarding the availability or not of any basis of jurisdiction; whereas the great 
advantage of a mixed convention is that it is easier for delegates to agree 
upon. However, the analysis has revealed one ostensible disadvantage of the 
mixed convention to be nonexistent – the idea that a convention with 
permitted bases is somehow “incomplete”. Recognizing permitted as an 
equally valid value for jurisdiction as required and excluded defeats this 
criticism. Any convention is complete, because any convention must allocate 
each basis of jurisdiction into one of the nine categories. 
4. Positive, Negative, and Bivalent Conventions 
Another distinction reformulates and clarifies the distinction between single 
and double conventions in the first sense discussed before. This distinction 
draws on whether a convention contains provision only for required (positive 
conventions), only for excluded (negative conventions), or for both required 
and excluded bases (bivalent conventions), regardless of any possible 
permitted bases. A double convention is positive if it contains no excluded 
bases of jurisdiction; all its bases are thus in boxes 1, 2, 4 and 5. It is radically 
positive (to use von Mehren's term)102 if it contains only required bases, so all 
bases are in boxes 1, 2, and 4. A positive enforcement convention contains 
only bases in the two left columns, a radical one only in the left column. A 
positive jurisdiction convention contains only bases in the upper two rows, a 
radical one only in the upper row. A double convention is negative if it 
contains no required bases; all its bases are thus in boxes 5, 6, 8 and 9. It is 
                                                          
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. at 25-8. 
102 Ibid. at 21 (calling the Brussels Regulation with regard to defendants not domiciled in a 
member state a "radical form of the convention simple"). Regarding such defendants, all bases are in 
category 4; see supra III.4.  
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radically negative if all bases are in boxes 6, 8 and 9. A negative enforcement 
convention contains only bases in the two right columns, a radical one only in 
the right column. A positive jurisdiction convention contains only bases in the 
lower two rows, a radical one only in the lower row. 
For example, the 1971 Hague Judgments Convention without the Supplemen-
tal Protocol is a positive enforcement convention. Its Articles 10 and 11 
provide a list of required bases of indirect jurisdiction. It is not a radical 
convention, though – since this list is nonexclusive, all other bases are 
permitted, none is excluded. However, read together with the Supplemental 
Protocol, which provides for excluded bases of indirect jurisdiction, the 1971 
Convention changes its character to that of a bivalent enforcement conven-





























Table 4: Positive and Negative conventions  
 
 Possible bases in a positive double convention 
 Possible bases in a negative double convention 
Here, the policies go to parties rather than to states. Positive conventions 
broaden the number of required jurisdictions. They are therefore by defini-
tion advantageous to plaintiffs for direct jurisdiction (because plaintiffs, not 
defendants, determine the forum). Yet they are also potentially advantageous 
to plaintiffs for indirect jurisdiction, because they broaden the number of 
places where a judgment can be enforced which the plaintiff, not the 
defendant, asks for.103 By contrast, negative conventions are beneficial to 
defendants for similar reasons – they can potentially reduce the number of 
                                                          
103 Ibid. at 24-5.  
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fora where defendants must defend themselves, and they reduce the number 
of countries where ensuing judgments can be enforced. 
5. Symmetric and Asymmetric Conventions 
A last bit of terminology must be introduced for a very important characteris-
tic – the symmetric and asymmetric convention. Whether a convention is 
symmetric draws on the relation between direct and indirect jurisdiction. A 
convention is symmetric if it treats all jurisdictional bases similarly for direct 
and for indirect jurisdiction: all bases required for direct jurisdiction are also 
required for indirect jurisdiction, all bases permitted for direct jurisdiction 
are also permitted for indirect jurisdiction, and all bases excluded for direct 
jurisdiction are also excluded for indirect jurisdiction.104 A convention that 
contains at least one basis of jurisdiction outside boxes 1, 5, and 9, such as the 
Brussels Regulation, is an asymmetric convention. Symmetric conventions 
contain jurisdictional bases only in boxes 1, 5, and 9.105 The 1999 Draft 
Convention is a symmetric convention in this sense; it contains only required-
required, permitted-permitted, and excluded-excluded bases of jurisdiction. 
In a pure symmetric convention, every basis of jurisdiction would be either 
required or excluded both for direct and for indirect jurisdiction. Note that 
the Brussels Regulation is not even a pure symmetric convention for 
defendants domiciled in the EU, because it treats all bases as required for 
indirect jurisdiction, even if they are required or permitted for indirect 
jurisdiction. It is symmetric only for insurer and consumer contracts and for 
exclusive bases of jurisdiction (Art. 35(1)). 
 
104 Symmetric single conventions, whether jurisdiction or enforcement jurisdictions, are logically 
impossible, because the only possible candidate – a convention in which all jurisdictional bases would 
be permitted both for direct and indirect jurisdiction (box 5) – would be equivalent to the State of 
Nature, which has been defined not to be a convention (supra IV.1). 
105 In this sense, the definition of a mixed convention in von Mehren, Design, supra note 2, at 19, 
refers to a special type only, namely the symmetric mixed convention. 




























Table 5: Symmetric conventions  
 
 Possible bases in a symmetric convention 
 Possible bases in a symmetric pure double convention  
Given how many Conventions are symmetric, it is understandable if scholars 
and drafters assume that symmetric conventions are somehow more 
“natural” than asymmetric conventions.106 The conceptual analysis may serve 
as a healthy antidote against such false assumptions of necessity. Certainly, 
where general agreement exists over the desirability vel non of a certain basis 
of jurisdiction, it makes sense to regulate it as required or excluded for both 
direct and indirect jurisdiction (boxes 1 and 9); where complete disagreement 
exists, it makes sense to put it (or better: leave it) in the permitted-permitted 
category (box 5). But the insight that asymmetric conventions are equally 
possible opens the way for all other values of jurisdiction, and thereby for at 
least three arguments against symmetry.107 First, asymmetric conventions 
can take a middle position between single and pure double conventions, by 
regulating certain bases only for direct or only for indirect jurisdiction. 
Second, the different policy considerations that may apply to direct and 
indirect jurisdiction108 do not require certain bases to be put into the 
permitted-permitted bases; they can be reflected in an asymmetric conven-
tion design. Third, asymmetry can avoid the need to control jurisdiction both 
in the rendering and in the requested court;109 it allows control only at the 
                                                          
106 See supra III.2. 
107 See also the policy considerations supra III.2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8. 
108 Supra II.2. 
109 Von Mehren, Jurisdictional Requirements, supra note 12. 
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rendering court (as the Brussels Regulation) or only at the requested court (as 
in a single enforcement convention). 
V. CONSEQUENCES 
It seems certain that delegates at the Hague were unaware of this richness of 
tools they had at their disposal – categories of jurisdictional bases and types 
of conventions. Had they realized these, the potential for flexibility in 
negotiating and drafting would have been much bigger. For example, the U.S. 
was interested in expanding required bases of indirect jurisdiction in Europe 
and in reducing permitted bases of jurisdiction in Article 4 of the Brussels 
Regulation. Europeans, by contrast, were interested in reducing permitted 
bases of direct jurisdiction in the U.S (like doing business and tag jurisdic-
tion). There was no intrinsic need to link the bases of direct and indirect 
jurisdiction. Rather, each side could have used its permitted or required bases 
of direct jurisdiction and its permitted or excluded bases of indirect jurisdic-
tion as bargaining chips in detailed negotiations. There was no need to give 
each basis the same value for direct and indirect jurisdiction alike. Such 
detailed negotiations might have led to a piecemeal convention, but that 
might have been preferable to no convention at all. 
Indeed, although this article has focused largely on the necessary conceptual 
analysis and has left specific application in policy debates for another day, the 
analysis has three important implications for policy analyses that can be 
listed here. 
First, it broadens considerably the options delegates have. Instead of two or 
three, they now see nine different possible values for bases of jurisdiction. 
This should make it easier to find subtle compromises for different issues. 
Second, the analysis has the advantage of isolating different issues that imply 
different considerations. Required bases serve plaintiffs’ interests – in finding 
a forum, and in enforcing ensuing judgments. Excluded bases serve defen-
dants’ interests – in avoiding litigation at undesired places, and in reducing 
the risk of enforcement. Permitted bases are favorable to state interests in 
maximal freedom, but unfavorable to party interests in predictability and 
uniformity. Required bases of indirect jurisdiction maximize the power of 
states to render judgments with extraterritorial effects; excluded bases of 
direct jurisdiction minimize their privilege to render decisions in the first 
place. Symmetric regulation of direct and indirect jurisdiction has a strong 
effect of channeling litigation to or away from such bases; asymmetric 
regulation enables more subtle regulation. All of these considerations can be 
assessed specifically for each specific basis of jurisdiction, before the 
appropriate box can be chosen.  
Third, the analysis provides a clearer picture at the macro-level of convention 
types. The basic insight is that a state of nature (or a situation with only 
permitted-permitted bases) is not an anomaly but rather the residual status 
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against which all negotiations take place. Conventions that regulate both 
direct and indirect jurisdiction are more complete and more balanced than 
single conventions but are harder to agree on. Since not all bases of jurisdic-
tion need to be regulated as either required or permitted, mixed conventions 
are possible that are restricted to the area of agreement. Conventions can be 
made more plaintiff-friendly or more defendant-friendly depending on 
whether they contain only required bases (positive conventions) or only 
excluded bases (negative conventions); they restrict state sovereignty most 
through excluded bases for direct jurisdiction and required bases for indirect 
jurisdiction (bivalent conventions). Symmetry between direct and indirect 
jurisdiction is not a necessary attribute of double conventions; the ability to 
regulate direct and indirect jurisdiction differently opens a great space of 
subtle regulation. 
This is not the place to speculate in detail what would have been possible at 
the Hague had delegates been aware of all these possibilities. However, future 
delegates should be able to realize the full array of possibilities at their hands. 
It remains to be seen whether they will use it. 
